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cut off Israel's only supply route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from its main supplier which was Iran. In
1956, the United States gave Israel assurances that it recognized the Jewish State's right of access to the Straits of
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Tiran. In 1957, at the U.N.’s maritime powers declared that Israel had a right to transit the Strait.
Nasser challenged Israel to fight almost daily “Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel.” The Arab people
want to fight, he said on May 27. The following day he added and said “We will not accept any...coexistence with
Israel....today the issue is not the establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel......the war with Israel is still in effect
since 1948.” The Arab verbal attacks were matched by the mobilization of Arab forces. Approximately 465,000
troops, more than 2,800 tanks, and 800 aircraft attacked Israel. By this time, Israeli forces had been on alert for
three weeks. Israel country could not remain fully mobilized indefinitely. It could not allow its sea lane through
the Gulf of Aqaba to be blockaded. Israel decided to preempt the expected Arab attack. To do this successfully,
Israel needed the element of surprise. Had it waited for an Arab invasion, Israel would have been at a potentially
catastrophic disadvantage. On June 5, Prime Minister Eshkol gave the order to attack Egypt.
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The United States tried to prevent the war through negotiations. However, the U.S. was not able to persuade
Nasser or the other Arab states to cease their hostile statements and actions. Still, right before the war Johnson
warned “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone.” Then, when the war began the State Department
announced the following: “Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed.” The Arabs were falsely accusing the
United States of airlifting supplies to Israel. Johnson imposed an arms embargo on the region. While, France
which was Israel's other main arms supplier also embargoed arms to Israel. By contrast, the Soviets were
supplying massive amounts of arms to the Arabs. Simultaneously, the armies of Kuwait, Algeria, Saudi Arabia
and Iraq were contributing troops and arms to the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian army fronts. 175
On June 5, 1967, Israel was indeed alone. But, its military commanders had conceived a brilliant war strategy.
The entire Israeli air force, with the exception of just 12 fighters assigned to defend Israeli air space, took off at
7:14 in the morning with the intent of bombing Egyptian airfields. This was while the Egyptian pilots were eating
breakfast. In less than 2 hours, roughly 300 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed. A few hours later, Israeli fighters
attacked the Jordanian and Syrian air forces as well as one airfield in Iraq. By the end of the first day, nearly the
entire Egyptian and Jordanian air forces and half the Syrians’ had been destroyed on the ground.
The battle then moved to the ground and some of history’s greatest tank battles were fought between Egyptian
and Israeli armies in the blazing heat of the Sinai desert. After just six days of fighting, Israeli forces were in a
position to march on Cairo, Damascus, and Amman. By this time, the principal objectives of capturing the Sinai
and the Golan Heights had been accomplished. Israeli political leaders had no desire to fight in the Arab capitals.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union had become increasingly alarmed by the Israeli advances and was threatening to
intervene. At this point, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk advised the Israelis “in the strongest possible terms” to
accept a cease-fire. On June 10, Israel did just that. The death toll on the Arab side was approximately 15,000
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Egyptians, 2,500 Syrians, and 800 Jordanians.
According to all the military analysts, it was considered to be a lopsided match. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
consisted of 275,000 troops, compared to the 465,000 soldiers of the combined Iraqi, Syrian, Jordanian and
Egyptian armies. The united Arab forces also had a decided edge with regards to weaponry and military
equipment. They had more than double the amount of tanks, and close to four times the amount of combat
179 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 293.
180 Yehuda Lukacs, Documents on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1967-1983, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984)
181 George Gruen, "The Refugees of Arab-Israeli Conflict," (NY: American Jewish Committee, March 1969)